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Abstract:   This paper examines whether managerial discretion over loan loss accruals,
accounting related transactions such as sales of investment securities, and financing
transactions are used to manage capital, earnings or taxes. We model discretion over these
decisions using a system of five equations generated from an underlying cost minimization
problem. The estimated parameters of the system suggest that banks manage both capital
and earnings using accounting, investment, and financing discretion. Tax management
appears to be relatively unimportant in the discretion exercised over these transactions.
The framework we use highlights trade-offs among accounting and financing transactions.
We find that accounting sources of capital in part determine banks' propensity to issue new
securities, and that the positive reported capital effects of gains from transactions such as
asset sales in part determine manager's willingness to charge-off loans.1 Introduction
This paper investigates if banks alter the timing and magnitude of transactions such as asset
sales, loan loss accruals, pension settlements and securities issues in response to primary
capital, tax and earnings goals. At least three recent studies, Moyer [1990]; Scholes, Wilson,
and Wolfson [1990]; and Collins, Shackelford and Wahlen [1993] provide evidence that banks
execute transactions and manage accruals to achieve some or all of these objectives. However,
a common feature of all of these studies is an implicit assumption that when managers
exercise discretion over a particular decision, all other decisions are fixed. We relax this
assumption and allow those decisions to be determined simultaneously.
We hypothesize that each year bank managers face a cost minimization problem that
encompasses the costs of deviating from primary capital, tax and earnings goals, as well as
the costs of exercising discretion over loan loss accruals, transactions such as assets sales, and
securities issues. The solution to the cost minimization problem is a system of five equations,
one for the optimal level of each of the items over which the manager can exercise discretion
to achieve the three goals. We estimate the system, first taking account of simultaneity and
then using ordinary least squares (which does not take account of simultaneity). The use of
different estimation techniques allows us to compare our results with those of prior studies,
to test formally for simultaneity, and to examine whether the system is well-specified.
This paper provides a convenient framework which can be applied to other settings where
managers make trade-offs among accounting, financing and operating decisions with tax,
political or other contracting cost implications. In addition, the paper contributes to the
literature that focuses on tax, financing and accounting trade-offs in banks. Assuming that
the proposed cost minimization problem is appropriate, our systems estimation provides two
distinct advantages. First, if firms choose among the discretionary transactions simultane-
ously, the system approach provides consistent parameter estimates whereas ordinary least
squares does not. Second, our model allows for a richer interpretation of the coefficients
1yielded from the estimation than would otherwise be possible. For example, we show how
our parameter estimates translate into measures of the relative costs of exercising discretion
over any of the five choices and of deviating from any of the three goals.
We are able to demonstrate that taking account of simultaneity is important for three of
the modelled choices but not for the other two. Specifically, we reject the hypothesis that
loan charge-offs, loan loss provisions, and the decision to issue securities are independent of
the other decisions. However, we fail to reject this hypothesis for a set of miscellaneous gains
and losses
1 and for pension settlement gains.
The parameter estimates yielded from the simultaneous estimation suggest that pension
settlement gains are used exclusively to manage earnings. Miscellaneous gains (losses) are
used primarily to manage earnings, and there is weaker evidence that they are used to man-
age capital. In selected specifications, where miscellaneous gains are defined as investment
securities gains (corresponding to prior studies), we find evidence that taxes play a role in
the timing of securities gains prior to the adoption of the 1986 Tax Act. We find no evidence
that taxes play a role in securities transactions following the Tax Act and no evidence that
they play a role in the timing of loan charge-offs. The provision for loan losses, loan charge-
offs and issuances of securities are all used to manage primary capital ratios. In addition,
discretion in each of these choices depends on the level of the other two, as well as on the
level of miscellaneous gains (losses). Thus we find interactions between accrual, investment,
and financing decisions which have intriguing policy implications. For example, limiting the
manager’s ability to strategically time gains from sales of securities (an implication of the
mark-to-market rule) may simply induce the manager to substitute an alternative form of
discretion, e.g. delaying or accelerating charge-offs and loan loss provisions.
Section 2 provides a detailed motivation for the systems approach adopted in this paper.
1See the discussion in appendix A. Miscellaneous gains and losses include several transactions whose
timing appears to be affected by financial statement considerations. For example this item includes, but is
not limited to, gains and losses realized from sales of securities, gains from sales of physical assets, and gains
from debt retirements.
2Formal development of the model is contained in section 3. Section 4 reviews the estimation
techniques, and describes our sample. Section 5 discusses the main results, specification
tests and sensitivity analyses. Section 6 summarizes the results, suggests extensions, and
discusses the accounting implications of our findings.
2 Motivation
We examine the use of discretion over loan charge-offs (Chgo), loan loss provisions (Prov),
miscellaneous gains (losses) (Miscg), gains on settling pension plans (Pen), and issuances of
securities (Chfund)
2 to achieve three, potentially conflicting goals: earnings, capital and tax
management. Table 1 summarizes the effect each of these transactions has over each of the
three goals. As discussed below, all three goals and all forms of discretion, are studied in
prior or concurrent research.
Tax incentives arise because firms can reduce the present value of tax payments by judi-
ciously timing transactions (e.g., selling an appreciated asset and recognizing an accounting
gain in a net operating loss period). Capital incentives arise because regulators monitor
banks using accounting-based capital measures. During our sample period, bank holding
companies are required to maintain a primary capital ratio of 5.5%.
3 Approaching the mini-
mum is costly because it increases the probability of regulatory intervention
4 while exceeding
the minimum is costly since excess capital could otherwise be used to expand earning assets
or could be returned to investors. Thus bank managers have incentives to use discretion over
accruals, the timing of transactions such as asset sales, and issuances of securities to balance
expected regulatory costs with the opportunity costs of maintaining excess capital.
2See appendix A for details on how these are measured.
3The primary capital ratio equals the sum of retained earnings, the allowance for loan losses and qualifying
securities divided by assets plus the allowance for loan losses. Securities included in primary capital are
common equity, certain types of preferred stock, and certain types of subordinated and convertible debt.
4Banks failing to meet regulatory capital guidelines can be taken over by regulators. These takeovers can
involve the dismissal of the current management, and other forms of participation in management activities
(e.g., disallowing merger activity, or reducing dividend payments).
3In contrast to capital and tax management, the economic intuition for earnings manage-
ment is less obvious. Although bank managers make statements consistent with earnings
management, their motivations are rarely articulated.
5 One potential explanation is the
communication of favorable future cash flow information through earnings that mimic (or
outperform) earnings of other banks. Consistent with this conjecture, regulators monitor a
variety of financial ratios for each bank compared to its peer group, including the ratio of
pre-tax net operating income to assets.
6 An extreme rating based on these financial ratios
can result in regulatory intervention, creating an incentive to manage ratios to a peer group
mean value. It is possible that analysts other than regulators also use peer-adjusted earnings
levels to evaluate banks. If so, deviations of earnings from peer group means could affect
the bank’s cost of capital.
Various methods of achieving these goals are investigated in prior studies. Scholes et al.
[1990] find evidence of earnings management, capital management and tax management in
their analysis of income from investment security transactions. Moyer [1990] finds that both
loan loss provisions and securities gains are used to manage capital. However, she finds no
evidence that loan charge-offs are used to manage capital. She also finds somewhat mixed
evidence that securities gains are used to manage taxes.
7 Haw, Jung and Lilien [1991] find
that income from pension settlements is used to smooth earnings (but not manage capital).
Similarly, Clinch and Magliolo [1993] conclude that income from a portfolio of discretionary
5Consider for example, the following language used in Citicorp’s Management Discussion in its 1987
annual report:
Other revenue totalled $1,585 million in 1987, largely as a result of steps taken to offset the effects of the
$3.0 billion addition to the allowance for possible credit losses.
This statement could imply that earnings management is an important reason for discretionary transactions,
although the motivation is left unstated.
6Peer groups are defined primarily by asset size. Each quarter a Uniform Performance Report is produced
for each bank. These reports are used as an early warning system by regulatory analysts. Each bank’s ratios
are compared to their respective peer group both in the current quarter and with the prior two year’s results.
7Moyer [1990] uses tax operating expense to measure marginal tax rates while Scholes et al. [1990] use
the existence of net operating loss carryforwards.
4transactions (similar to our miscellaneous gains and losses variable) is realized to manage
earnings. Finally, Collins et al. [1993] find that loan loss provisions, loan charge-offs, and
securities issuances are all used to manage primary capital, and that loan loss provisions and
income from securities transactions are used to manage earnings.
These studies do not examine the interactions among transactions that might arise for
two reasons. First, when earnings, tax, and capital management objectives conflict, they are
likely to be traded off against one another. Second, if the cost of exercising discretion over
transactions depends on the amount of discretion used, then different forms of discretionary
behavior will interact (e.g., the use of the loan loss provision to achieve capital objectives
will depend on how costly it is to issue new securities). Thus, there is potential for a complex
dependence among different discretionary transactions. Our approach explicitly allows for
such complex interactions.
The potential for joint determination of these variables although acknowledged in some
previous studies, has not been explicitly incorporated in the research design. For example,
Moyer [1990] examines discretion over securities gains, loan loss provisions, and loan charge-
offs, but does not explicitly consider the interdependencies among these three items. She
separately regresses each item on tax, capital, and other variables, but the other dependent
variables are not assumed to interact with one another.
8  In their cross-sectional analysis of
securities transactions, Scholes et al. [1990] assume that income from investment securities
sales depends on the provision for loan losses, but they do not allow securities gains to
affect the size of the provision. Haw et al. [1991] make the opposite assumption, regressing
loan loss provisions on securities gains and pension settlement income (for a cross-section of
banks); they implicitly assume that pension settlement income and income from securities
sales are exogenous with respect to the provision for loan losses.
The differences in exogeneity assumptions across these papers highlight the difficulty
8Moyer [1990] does allow for dependence of residuals across three equations.
5in determining which transactions are exogenous (i.e. fixed) on theoretical grounds, and
suggest the need for empirical analysis that allows for interdependence of all of the examined
variables. Allowing for interdependence requires that we make explicit the structure of the
problem; this structure is discussed in the next section.
3 Description of Research Design
3.1 Model Specification
The system of equations we estimate is consistent with managers assessing their position
and selecting among discretionary transactions to achieve these three goals. We assume
that the three goals are constant across firms and across the sample time period, and that
the discretionary transactions are loan loss accruals (Chgo and Prov), miscellaneous gains
(losses) (Miscg), pension settlements (Pen), and new securities issues (Chfund). In addition,
we assume there is as an optimal level for each of these choices (in the absence of the three
goals) corresponding to its non-discretionary component. For example, auditing standards
require that firms set their charge-offs and loan loss provisions based on the underlying
riskiness of the loan portfolio. If bank managers choose some level other than that required
by auditing standards then they run the risk of not receiving clean opinions. The non-
minimization problem facing managers can be written as follows:
Minimize Cost
Chgo, Prov, Miscg, Pen, Chfund
6Other terms are defined as follows:
  the year-end primary capital measure evaluated by bank regulators
taxable income influenced by managers
the year-end pre-tax earnings measure evaluated by regulators and investors
the marginal tax rate for firm i in period t
primary capital before endogenous transactions
pre-tax earnings before endogenous transactions
   taxable income before endogenous transactions.
Differentiating this objective function results in a set of five first order conditions that
forms the basis for our system of equations. The possibility of jointly determined decisions
arises through equations (2), (3),
variables. These equations originate from the following accounting identities
9:
Primary Capital Before Transactions – Charge offs +
(Tax Rate × Provision) + After-tax Gains on Miscellaneous Transactions
+ After-tax Pension Settlement Gains + Issues of Securities
Pre-tax Earnings Before Transactions – Provision + Gains on
Miscellaneous Transactions + Pension Settlement Gains
Taxable Earnings Before Transactions – Charge-offs + Gains on
Miscellaneous Transactions
There are four important features of our formulation. First, we assume that, in addition to
the non-discretionary components of our endogenous variables, there are other components of
intuition that at year-end these components are excessively costly to alter. For example, we
assume that the manager has no control over the net interest margin. We admit that, given
enough time, influence can be exerted over almost any transaction. Although we assume
that large components of earnings and balance sheet variables are beyond the manager’s
control, our model relaxes the exogeneity restrictions used in previous studies, which assume
9The loan loss provision has a positive effect on primary capital because it is deducted from earnings on
an after-tax basis, but is added back to the loan loss reserve on a before- tax basis.
7that all transactions other than the one examined are exogenously determined.
10
Second, we do not restrict the coefficients in equations (2)-(4) to be equal to the weight-
ings in the accounting identities. This allows us to estimate the measure of earnings, tax,
and capital that managers use. For example, if firms manage earnings before gains on sales
of securities because industry analysts routinely adjust earnings for securities gains, then
includes securities gains.)
Third, endogenous variables not included in the accounting definition of earnings or tax-
able earnings, are excluded from the associated cost function (e.g. the charge-off variable is
function.) Later, this assumption allows us to restrict the coeffi-
restrictions are economically motivated, they help us to identify the system.
11
Finally, as shown in table 1, two of our modelled choices: Miscg and Chfund combine
potentially non-homogenous discretionary transactions, whereas the other three endogenous
variables, Chgo, Prov and Pen contain only one transaction type. We group the different
components of Miscg and Chfund to keep the system as parsimonious as possible. Table 1
shows that the selection of these five endogenous variables reflects the smallest number of
equations possible consistent with all grouped variables having the same assumed directional
effect on capital, earnings, and tax goals. Although the components of the grouped variables
have comparable primary capital and earnings effects, we admit, that the different compo-
nents of Miscg and Chfund may have different tax implications. Moreover, an additional
10The cost of relaxing the exogeneity restriction is that our estimator is less efficient if the variable is
truly exogenous. The cost of imposing the exogeneity restriction is that the estimator is inconsistent if the
variable is not exogenous.
11We do examine the robustness of results to altering some of these zero restrictions in section 5. We thank
Peter Wilson for pointing out the need for this type of sensitivity analysis. Using the accounting definitions
of primary capital, earnings and taxable earnings to generate zero restrictions can reflect fallacious reasoning.
For example, suppose that earnings and charge-offs are jointly evaluated by stock analysts in assessing firm
health. If so, exercising discretion over charge-offs may be conditioned on expected earnings even though
charge-offs do not affect earnings through the accounting definition.assumption made in combining these variables is that the costs associated with deviating
from the non-discretionary component are the same across the grouped variables. In section
5, we examine the sensitivity of our findings to these assumptions.
To obtain linear first-order conditions, we assume that each bank is close enough to
the minimum of each cost function that we can use a quadratic approximation and that
uncertainty regarding the target. Specifically, we assume that equation (1) can be re-written
as follows:
Minimize Cost
{Chgo, Prov, Miscg, Pen, Chfund}
the objective function with respect to each of the five choices results in a system of five
simultaneously determined equations:
9This system is estimated using the techniques described in section 4. As shown in table 2,
the estimated coefficients from this system provide information about the parameters of the
the hypotheses that discretion over the transaction is used to achieve the capital, earnings
and tax goals. A zero coefficient on these variables indicates either that it is costless to
deviate from a goal or that the examined transaction is not used to achieve that goal. For
Second, the partial correlations among the endogenous variables provide information
about whether the endogenous variables are jointly determined or instead are determined
sequentially (i.e., a given variable is chosen without regard to the other decisions.) For
on Miscg in the Prov equation) is non-zero, then this would suggest that miscellaneous gains
(losses) are selected without regard to the level of the provision for loan losses. One scenario
generating this sequential relationship is if it were costless to manage the provision for loan
losses, costless to manage loan charge-offs, and if tax consequences of all decisions were
ignored. Note that under these conditions, the primary capital goal could be attained using
Chgo (since managers are unconcerned with Chgo when managing charge-offs is costless) and
the earnings management objective could be achieved through Prov (because analogously,
managers are unconcerned with Prov). Since taxes are unimportant, managers set Miscg
end primary capital and earnings), but Miscg would not depend on either Chgo or Prov.
Finally, assuming that the endogenous variables are jointly determined, the magnitude of
the coefficients on the endogenous variables will depend on the relative costs of any shared
10can be either positive or negative depending on the importance of earnings management and
capital management in choosing miscellaneous gains (losses) and the provision. If earnings
will be positive and if capital
3.2 Measurement of Variables
3.2.1 Measurement of Marginal Tax Rate
We face the usual problem that firms’ marginal tax rates are unobservable. In addition, the
1986 Tax Act (Tax Act) creates other challenges. First, the Tax Act affected the marginal
tax rate both by lowering the corporate tax rate and by disallowing the deduction of interest
on loans supporting tax-free bonds. Second, the Tax Act changed the role of charge-offs in
managing taxes. After 1986 all large banks must adopt the specific charge-off method. This
method ties loan charge-offs more directly to taxable income than the previously allowed
reserve methods. Finally, the Tax Act changed the net operating loss carryover rules for
banks. Prior to 1986, banks were allowed to carry losses back ten years and forward five.
After 1986, losses generated by anything other than bad debt expense could only be carried
back three years and forward for fifteen years.
12
We use a discrete proxy for firm-specific marginal tax rates that equals one if the bank
has a net operating loss carryforward and zero otherwise. This proxy has been used in a
number of other studies, including Scholes et al. [1990].  However, because of the changes in
the tax law, we allow the coefficient on this variable to differ for the 1985-1986 and 1987-
1989 subperiods.
and after (af) the Tax Act. Both variables separate low marginal tax rate firms from high
12Banks having losses generated by bad debt expense have the option to choose the back-three, forward-
fifteen schedule if desired. The Tax Act stipulates that by 1992 banks are required to use the back-three
forward-fifteen schedule for bad debt expense as well.
11marginal tax rate firms. Based on equation (3), we expect that banks with net operating loss-
carryforwards will incur more (fewer) miscellaneous gains (charge-offs) than banks without
tax operating loss-carryforwards.
3.2.2 Measuring Non-discretionary Components
Our estimation technique requires that each equation exclude at least four of the exogenous
variables (one for each included endogenous variable). Incorporating the non-discretionary
that this condition is satisfied,
13 and it is therefore critical that we find suitable measures of
these non-discretionary components.
To measure these components: we rely loosely on arguments developed in Moyer [1990]
and Wahlen [1992] for loan loss provisions and charge-offs, and on Moyer [1990] for gains
(losses) on sales of investment securities. The reliance on these papers is loose because our
needs are slightly different. In particular, to be consistent with our framework, the proxies
for non-discretionary components should be firm-specific and exogenous to the modelled vari-
able. In addition, the proxies should satisfy the zero restrictions required for identification.
14
We develop our own measures of non-discretionary components for the pension settlement
and change in external financing equations.
Loan charge-offs and the provision for loan losses are expected to be partly non-discretionary
due to Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No.5, which requires the al-
lowance for loan losses to be sufficient to cover probable and estimable losses. Following
Moyer [1990] we assume that the non-discretionary provision reflects primarily the change in
the default rate on the loan portfolio, and that the non-discretionary charge-off reflects pri-
included in the system, zero restrictions in the remaining equations also aid us in identifying the system.
14A zero restriction means that the coefficient on an exogenous variable is constrained to be zero in a given
equation.
12marily lagged default values.
15 However, unlike Moyer [1990] who constructs lagged default
values of the loan portfolio using macroeconomic data, we try to measure the firm-specific
gously, we measure the change in the default value on the loan portfolio by the change from
Following Wahlen [1992],
additional loan loss determinant. The loan loss reserve summarizes past decisions regarding
charge-offs and loan loss provisions, and is therefore exogenous to this period’s decisions.
Since provisioned loans ultimately are charged-off, loan charge-offs are expected to be higher
when the loan loss reserve is higher. Similarly, if in prior periods managers exercised discre-
tion to over- (under-) provide for expected loan losses, the loan loss provision is expected to
be lower (higher) in this period.
To summarize, the non-discretionary components of loan loss provisions and loan charge-
offs can be expressed as follows:
For many of our firm-years, Miscg is primarily income from investment securities sales.
Because these securities are used to manage liquidity and interest rate risk, we assume
that some percentage of the investment securities portfolio turns over each year. Non-
discretionary gains or losses realized from this turn-over are expected to be a percentage of
the overall implied gain or loss on the portfolio. We estimate the overall gains or losses using
15This is based on our own interpretation of her equations (3) and (5) on pages 136 and 137. More
accurately, Moyer’s model would argue for including lagged default values, squared lagged default values and
changes in the default value of the loan portfolio in the loan loss provision equation and only lagged default
values in the charge-off equation. We choose a more parsimonious specification for the loan loss equations,
but, we do examine the sensitivity of our model to a variation on the specification of the non-discretionary
components.
16We credit Wahlen [1993] for this idea.
13securities gains or losses different from the non-discretionary amount is the cost of deviating
from the productive optimum.
We assume that the non-discretionary pension settlement gain is a fraction of the dif-
ference between pension assets and pension liabilities (Apens). Under SFAS 87, the income
statement effects of overfunding can be realized in one of two ways. First, the gain can be
amortized onto the income statement over a number of years using the expense smoothing
rules prescribed by the accounting standard; this corresponds to our notion of the non-
discretionary component of the pension settlement. Alternatively, some larger portion of the
gain can be recognized in the current period by settling the plan assets (implying the use of
discretion).
17 The cost of deviating from the non-discretionary settlement component is the
opportunity cost of eliminating the option to manage income in a future period.
18
To model the non-discretionary component of the change in external funds variable, we
assume that the firm has financing demands each period (e.g. for liquidity reasons). In the
absence of primary capital demands, the portion provided by common and preferred equity
the relative expense of using capital notes and equity to meet those demands. We do not
attempt to model the demand for funds, but instead include variables that proxy for the cost
of issuing capital notes and equity. In particular, we assume that banks which have issued
large quantities of common equity in the past are firms that face lower costs. In contrast, we
assume that the costs of issuing new securities will be higher if the firm has issued primary
capital notes or preferred stock in the past. Primary capital rules limit the amount of debt
and preferred stock that can be counted as primary capital. Firms that have issued notes in
the past are therefore expected to have exhausted some of their financial slack. Based on this
17Since there are no instances of the sample banks taking losses on settling pension assets, we assign Apens
the value of zero if the difference between pension assets and projected benefit obligations is negative.
18Pension settlements also generate other costs such as the payment to an insurance company to take on
additional risk.
14To summarize, the non-discretionary components of Miscg, Pen and Chfund can be ex-
pressed as follows:
3.2.3 Other Explanators
As stated, our model assumes the decision process is the same for all banks. In our estimation
we alter this assumption by including two other explanatory dummy variables in all five
equations. The first is a dummy variable which takes on a value of one for any of the twelve
money center banks (MC).
19 Other studies such as Scholes et al. [1990] also allow their
model intercepts to vary for this category. Collins et al. [1993] note that money center
banks negotiated their own capital requirements in the early 1980’s, suggesting that for at
least some period, the targeted primary capital ratio and possibly earnings goals differed for
this subset of firms.
The second dummy variable takes on a value of one in 1987 to 1989 if the bank has
non-performing loan exposure to lesser developed countries (denoted Ldc). Both Elliott, et
al. [1991], and Griffin and Wallach [1991],  discuss how the 1987 Latin American debt crisis
led such banks to take substantial increases in their loan loss provisions and subsequently
in their loan charge-offs. One interpretation of this behavior is that the non-discretionary
component of charge-offs and provisions (and potentially other decisions) are likely to differ
for banks with and without these exposures.
19We use the twelve banks listed in Elliott, Hanna, and Shaw [1991] pg 850.
154 Empirical Method and Sample
4.1 Estimation
If any of our endogenous variables are jointly determined, ordinary least squares yields
inconsistent parameter estimates due to correlation of some of the explanatory variables
with the equation errors. To handle potential simultaneity, we use a two-stage and three-
stage, instrumental variables approach. The first stage regresses each endogenous variable
on all exogenous variables. Because the exogenous variables are assumed independent of
the unobserved errors, and correlated with the endogenous variables, the predicted values of
the endogenous variables from the first stage are independent of the unobserved errors. In
the second stage, these predicted values replace the right-hand-side endogenous variables,
yielding consistent parameter estimates. Efficient estimators are obtained by extending the
instrumental variable estimation done equation by equation (2SLS) to an estimation on all
equations allowing for cross-equation correlation using three-stage least squares (3SLS).
If the assumed endogenous variables are independently determined, both the two-stage
and ordinary least squares estimates are consistent. However, the two-stage estimates are
not as efficient. This relation between two-stage least squares and ordinary least squares
allows us to test the hypothesis that the five discretionary variables are simultaneously
determined (Hausman [1978]). Under the null hypothesis (i.e. the five decision variables are
independently determined), a Hausman test requires that one estimator be both consistent
and efficient (the OLS estimator), and that one be consistent but not efficient (2SLS). Under
the alternative that the decision variables are jointly determined, only the 2SLS estimates
will be consistent. The Hausman test simply compares the vector of coefficients under the
two estimations. A similar relation between the three stage least squares estimates and the
two stage least square estimates allows us to perform a specification test for the system.
20
20Under 3SLS, if any single equation is misspecified, this misspecification is transmitted to all equations,
due to using an inconsistently estimated covariance matrix in the third stage. Under 2SLS, only the single
equation that is misspecified is affected by the misspecification. Under the null of no misspecification, the
164.2 Sample Selection
Table 3 shows that our sample derives from the population of 752 domestic bank years
contained on the 1987 (1986 year-end) and 1990 (1989 year-end) Bank Compustat tapes.
Two tapes are used to mitigate any survivorship bias.
2l Since many of our variables can be
collected only from annual reports, we obtained annual reports for as many bank years as
possible. We were unable to obtain such reports, or failed to find particular data items for 70
firm years. In addition, because we believe that regulatory-supervised banks face different
objective functions, we deleted thirty-three observations comprising banks operating under
some form of agreement with bank regulators. We deleted eleven other bank years for a
variety of other reasons, listed on the bottom of table 3. The resulting sample consists of
638 firm years representing 148 different bank holding companies.
22
Table 4 shows that banks in our sample range from under $200 million to over $200
billion in assets with the mean size at about $15 billion. Our sample banks are generally
profitable and well capitalized, although there is variability across years (e.g. in 1987 many
sample banks experienced losses due in part to the Latin American debt crisis). In every year
but 1989, all sample banks report primary capital ratios above the required minimum, and
the highest primary capital ratio reported is twice the regulatory minimum.
23 The average
primary capital ratio sharply increases during the period from approximately 7.1% to 7.9%.
This increase is due both to a .4% increase in the loan loss reserves during this period and
to a .4% increase in securities qualifying as primary capital.
Descriptive information about the endogenous variables is reported in table 5, which
three-stage least squares results are efficient and consistent and the 2SLS results are consistent but not
efficient.
21Bank Compustat deletes observations which do not exist at the time the data are compiled. For example,
the 1990 tape would not include any banks acquired in 1988, whereas the 1987 tape would include such banks.
For such cases, we hand-collect data from the annual reports (after 1986) until the bank is acquired.
22The list of bank-years included in our sample is available on request.
23The set of banks under regulatory agreements includes many banks with capital below the 5.5% mini-
mum, and a few banks (primarily domiciled in Texas) with negative primary capital ratios.
17reports statistics about the variable distributions for all firm years combined and table 6
which provides means and medians for the endogenous (and exogenous) variables for each
sample year. All endogenous variables are scaled by primary capital to provide an indication
of their importance in capital management.
An after-tax comparison of the values reported in table 5 can be made using the account-
ing definition of primary capital on page 7, and assuming a marginal tax rate for all firms
of 34%. On an after-tax basis, net income has a relatively large effect on primary capital,
increasing it by approximately 8.3%. Charge-offs reduce capital by approximately 5.1%.
The provision for loan losses offsets this reduction by about 2.4%, and issuances of securities
Chfund, increase capital by a mean (median) of 3.84% (.77%). Finally, miscellaneous gains
(losses) and pension settlement gains have relatively small mean effects on capital, .9% and
.08% on average, respectively.
Table 6 panel A shows that the level of the endogenous variables varies from year to year.
In particular growth in the loan loss provision is interrupted by a large increase in levels in
1987 and a sharp decline in 1988.
24 Miscellaneous gains (losses) declined during the period,
with the largest transactions occurring in 1986. Changes in external funds were dramatically
lower in 1988-1989 than they were in 1985-1987. Although the variability exhibited in tables
4 and 6 is beneficial in our estimation, we are concerned with stability of the decision process.
We therefore discuss in section 5 the sensitivity of our findings to time period specific factors.
Panel B of table 6 provides a profile of the exogenous variables by year. The percentage
of firms with tax loss carryforwards is approximately 10% per year. Primary capital before
endogenous transactions is lower than the ending period level in 1985-1987, and vice versa
for 1988-1989. In contrast earnings before endogenous transactions are higher per year
then their counterparts in table 4, reflecting primarily the negative effects and loan loss
provisions. Both non-performing loans and the change in non-performing loans increased
24As mentioned, the 1987 increase in the provision is due to the Latin American debt crisis.
18in 1987, possibly due to the debt crisis. Approximately 35% of our sample firms had non-
performing loan exposure to lesser developed countries. The percentage of common equity
(capital notes plus preferred stock) increased as a percentage of assets from approximately
2.5% (.5%) to 2.9% (.7%) over the sample period.
Panel A of table 7 reports correlations of the endogenous variables with our measures
one another. Charge-offs, stock and debt issuances, shown in table 6 to have the largest
capital effects, are most highly correlated with Pcap (correlations of .21, -.44 and -.22).
The remaining endogenous variables are more highly correlated with Earn than with Pcap.
Table 7 panel A also shows significant correlations between the endogenous variables. Not
surprisingly, the simple correlation between charge-offs and the provision of .77 is the highest
of the correlations among endogenous variables.
Table 7, panel B provides evidence that the exogenous determinants of non-discretionary
components are generally highly correlated with their respective dependent variables. Loan
charge-offs and loan loss provisions exhibit correlations of higher than 40% with the lagged
non-performing loans and changes in non-performing loans. Both are also significantly cor-
related with the lagged loan loss reserve. Significant correlations, of .25 and .28, exist for
net pension assets (Apens) with the pension settlement gains and for Yldbv with gains on
sales of securities. Similarly, the lagged level of capital notes plus preferred stock exhibit a
correlation of -.32 with current changes in preferred plus capital notes, and lagged levels of
common stock exhibit a correlation of .11 with issuances of common.
5 Results
5.1 Overview
Our main results are summarized in tables 8, 9 and 10 which present the two stage, three stage
and ordinary least squares estimates of our five equations. For the full sample, the Hausman
19test comparing the coefficients yielded under three-stage least squares with those yielded
under two-stage least squares rejects, suggesting that our system has some misspecification.
We explore likely sources of misspecification at the end of this section. However, as discussed
below, most of our results are robust to reasonable permutations on model specification.
5.1.1 Investigation of Capital Management
Recall from table 2 that the estimated coefficient on Pcap (primary capital measured before
the endogenous transactions) in each equation provides a joint test that capital management
is non-zero.) Tables 8 and 9 show that the estimated coefficients on Pcap
in all equations except the pension settlement equation support this joint hypothesis. In
all four equations, the sign of the coefficient on Pcap suggests a positive cost of deviating
from the capital goal. The three stage estimated parameters reject the null hypothesis of
no relation at greater than the 5% levels (one-tailed tests) in all four equations; in the two
stage estimation the parameters reject the null in all but the Miscg equation. Given the
support for the hypothesis that deviating from the capital target is costly, the statistically
insignificant coefficient on Pcap in the Pen equation suggests that pension settlement gains
The importance of capital management is also supported by the coefficients on the right-
hand-side endogenous variables in the five equations. For example, we predict positive
partial correlations of charge-offs with the other variables used to manage capital. The
partial correlations are positive for all but the pension settlement gain; and, we have already
argued that pension settlement gains are not used to manage capital. Similarly, the capital
management hypothesis predicts a positive partial correlation of Chfund with Chgo and a
negative partial correlation of Chfund with the other three endogenous variables. These
predictions are also supported in both the two stage and three stage results.
20The partial correlations of Prov with Miscg or Pen are expected to be negative if the
primary capital goal is particularly costly, and positive if the earnings management goal is
costly. (If the two goals were equally expensive, these partial correlations would be zero.) The
partial correlation between Prov and Miscg is negative, although the coefficient is not sta-
tistically different from zero in the Miscg equation. The positive partial correlation between
Prov and Pen (especially in, the pension settlement equation) is consistent with earnings
management and is discussed below.
Finally, a negative partial correlation between Miscg and Pen would be consistent with
either capital management or earnings management. Table 8 shows that these partial cor-
relations are negative, but the standard errors are large. The weak evidence of a statistical
relation between Pen and Miscg suggests that these two choices are independent of one
another. This conclusion is supported by the Hausman test discussed later.
5.1.2 Investigation of Earnings Management
The coefficients-on Earn in the Miscg and Pen equations are negative and statistically sig-
nificant in both the two and three-stage results. This is consistent with the joint hypotheses
Other evidence of earnings management is manifested in the positive and statistically signif-
icant coefficient on Prov in the Pen equation, which suggests that pension settlement gains
are used to offset the negative earnings effect of the provision for loan losses. Note that
zero, the positive coefficient on Prov in the Pen equation supports our earlier conclusion that
Evidence from the provision equation is, however, slightly in conflict with this explanation
for the positive coefficient on Prov in the Pen equation. The provision for loan losses is
21unrelated to Earn, which indicates (table 2) that managers do not exercise discretion over
zero, the we would expect the partial correlation between Prov and Pen to be zero in both
equations. We are unable to fully reconcile this disparity in the two equations, but we do
explore sources of misspecification below.
5.1.3 Investigation of Tax Planning
We find no support for the tax planning hypothesis in either the charge-off or the miscella-
neous gains equations for the two-stage formulation. In both equations, the coefficients on 
stage results where we find that banks with low marginal tax rates took larger miscellaneous
gains in 1985-1986.
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5.2 Comparison of Results with OLS and 2SLS
We report the results of estimating each equation separately using ordinary least squares
(OLS) in table 10. The OLS estimates are not consistent if the endogenous variables are
chosen simultaneously.
A comparison of tables 8 and 10 shows that the conclusions drawn from the OLS regres-
sions for three of the five equations, Prov, Chgo, and Chfund are quite different from those
of the 2SLS estimations. The OLS results provide no evidence that the loan loss provision is
used to manage capital. Instead, based on the coefficients on Pen and Miscg, this equation
suggests that Prov is used to manage earnings. In contrast, under 2SLS the partial corre-
Prov and the endogenous variables (except Pen which is statistically unrelated to Prov in this equation);
these partial correlations are consistent with capital management and not earnings management.
carryforwards are correlated with other firm characteristics, such as financial distress. Given this, we explore
the sensitivity of our estimated parameters to both including and excluding this variable from all equations
in section 5.3.
22lations in the Prov equation are consistent with capital management. Turning to the Chgo
and Chfund equations, we find variations in the magnitude of coefficients on Pcap and on
the right-hand-side endogenous variables across the two methods. In some cases, such as the
coefficient on Chfund in the Chgo equation, both the sign and significance of the coefficient
differ under the two methods.
On the other hand, in the Miscg and Pen equations, the differences between OLS and
2SLS are more minor. Although many of the coefficients reflect changes in magnitude across
the two methods, in most cases signs do not change; in addition, coefficients which are (are
not) statistically different from zero in the OLS, remain so in 2SLS. For example, the sign
and significance of the estimated coefficients on Earn, in both OLS and 2SLS, suggest that
Miscg and Pen are used to manage earnings. Apparently, taking account of simultaneity in
these two equations does not greatly affect their interpretation.
Differences in the vector of coefficients yielded from OLS and 2SLS can be due to misspec-
ification due to simultaneity. We test the joint endogeneity assumption using the Hausman
test. The test is implemented by regressing each dependent endogenous variable on the
relevant instrumented endogenous variables, actual endogenous variables, and exogenous
variables.
27 If the variables assumed endogenous are actually exogenous, then the coeffi-
cients on the instrumented endogenous variables will (jointly) equal zero. We reject this null
hypothesis at conventional levels in the Chgo, Prov, and Chfund equations; however, the null
cannot be rejected in the Pen and Miscg equations.
28
The validity of this specification test depends on the assumption that the instruments
are uncorrelated with the error, and the power of the test depends on how highly correlated
27 Instrumented endogenous variable means the predicted value of the variable after regressing it on all the
exogenous variables.
28In each F-test, there are 4 and approximately 624 degrees of freedom. Four restrictions are tested in
each equation (one for each instrumented endogenous variable included in the equation). The F-value and
significance level at which the null hypothesis could be rejected are as follows for each equation: Chgo
equation: 9.54, 0.0001 level; Prov equation: 11.66, 0.0001 level; Miscg equation: 1.02, 0.399 level; Pen
equation: 1.25, 0.288 level; and Chfund equation: 3.37, 0.0001 level.
23the instruments are with the independent variables. Note that the requirement that the
instruments are independent of the error is also necessary for proper specification of the
OLS estimation. Rejection of the test suggests that the instrumental variable method used
to estimate our system is more appropriate than OLS. We add that instrumental variable
estimation corrects many forms of misspecification, so the difference between the OLS and
two stage least squares results can be due to something other than endogeneity. Regardless
of the source of the misspecification however, OLS estimation appears to be inappropriate.
The failure to reject the null hypothesis in the Miscg and Pen equations could indicate
that these two decisions truly are not jointly determined with the others. However, the
positive and significant coefficients on Prov in the Pen equation, on Chgo in the Miscg
equation, and on Miscg in the Chgo equation are difficult to explain if this is the case.
29
Alternatively, the failure to reject could reflect low power due to the use of instruments that
are not highly correlated with the endogenous variables. This seems more likely in modelling
Miscg, because Yldbv is expected to only measure the non-discretionary component of gains
on sales of securities. (Recall from table 7 that the correlation between Yldbv and gains on
sales of securities Sg is .25 whereas the correlation of Yldbv with the other components of
Miscg is -.07). Finally, some other misspecification may induce these somewhat contradictory
findings. As mentioned, the rejection of the Hausman test comparing 2SLS with 3SLS
suggests that there is some misspecification in our system. We attempt to locate sources of
this in the next section.
5.3 Investigation of Alternative Specifications
For tractability, our model makes a number of simplifying assumptions. The components of
Chfund and  Miscg are assumed to have the same tax implications and the same relation to
29‘One explanation, consistent with our findings, is that Prov is considered by managers to be a part of
pre-determined earnings (Earn). If so, given our definition of Earn, Prov and Earn would have the same
coefficient but with opposite signs. However, we are unable to explain the positive partial correlation of
Chgo with Miscg in the context of our model.
24their measures of non-discretionary components. We assume that the model coefficients are
constant across time and across firms. Finally, we have imposed zero restrictions for some
variables which may not hold. This section reports the effects of re-formulating our model
to relax these assumptions.
TO allow for non-homogenous components of Chfund, we re-estimate the model, substi-
tuting separate equations for issuances of capital notes and issuances of common stock plus
preferred stock;
30 both equations include tax dummy variables. We find evidence supporting
are statistically insignificant, and the other results are very similar to those reported above.
We examine the specification of Miscg by redefining it to comprise only income from
sales of investment securities. The assumption that Miscg is homogenous with respect to
its non-discretionary determinants and with respect to tax objectives is more likely to hold
under this definition. Under this specification, an important change is that there is evidence
is positive, and we can reject the hypothesis that the coefficient equals zero (t = 2.26) in the
two stage results. We still find evidence of capital management in the Miscg equation, and
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that securities gains are independently determined.
31
On balance, this formulation provides results loosely consistent with the findings observed
in Scholes et al. [1990], e.g. there is evidence of capital, tax and earnings management
in the decision to realized securities gains. While the failure to reject that securities gains
are independently determined suggests that the differences between OLS and simultaneous
methods are not large, we point out that the evidence of capital management is confined to
the system approach. Finally, the changes in the results which occur when we redefine Miscg
suggest that the misspecification in our system is likely to be linked to this equation.
30We use the prior period level of these variables as measures of the non-discretionary components.
31The t-statistic on Pcap is -1.25 (-2.23) in the two-stage (three-stage) results. The Hausman test of the
null of no misspecification, e.g. the 2SLS versus 3SLS comparison, rejects at conventional levels.
25To allow for potential instability in our parameters across time, we expand each equation
to allow for different intercepts for each year. In each equation, one or more of these dummy
variables yields coefficients which are statistically distinguishable from zero. In addition,
this modification weakens the capital management results in the Miscg equation. Under
both 2SLS and 3SLS, the evidence suggests that banks use Miscg primarily to manage
earnings.
32 In this model, the earnings management results in the Pen equation are somewhat
weaker, especially in the two stage least squares estimation. The remaining equations provide
evidence of capital management similar to our original formulation.
33
We relax the assumption that coefficients are stable across firms by adding peer group
dummy variables to the specification with time varying intercepts. Since regulators monitor
by peer groupings, banks in different groups might manage earnings and primary capital to
different goals. Allowing intercepts in each equation to vary by peer group, essentially lets
Consistent with peer groups managing to different targets,
the coefficients on the dummy variables are statistically significant in the Prov and Chgo
equations. However, the other results remain qualitatively unchanged. We also find that if we
confine our sample to larger banks, (e.g. greater than $2 billion in assets, 591 bank years) that
the 2SLS versus 3SLS specification test fails to reject the hypothesis of no misspecification.
These results suggest that another likely source of misspecification in our full sample is the
32However, if we add year dummies to the specification where Miscg is confined to gains on sales of
securities, the capital management hypothesis is supported in the 3SLS estimation.
33Estimations of our model over various subperiods are difficult to characterize because they change
depending on whether Miscg is restricted to gains on sales of securities or whether it is defined more broadly.
This instability is exacerbated by the small number of observations for a subperiod (approximately 250)
in comparison to the number of estimated parameters (53). However, whether we define Miscg to include
all transactions or just gains on sales of investment securities, we find no evidence that Miscg during the
1987-1989 is used to manage earnings (i.e. the coefficient on Earn does not differ statistically from zero).
34Peer groups are defined according to the federal reserve definitions as of 1988: peer group 1, banks with
greater than $l0 billion in assets (221 bank years), group 2 with between $3 billion and $10 billion in assets
(308 bank years), group 3 with between $1 billion and $3 billion in assets (77 bank years) and peer group
4 between $500 million and $1 billion (9 bank years). Twenty-three banks have assets of less than $500
million.
26grouping of banks together which have slightly different decision processes.
35
Finally, we examine model sensitivity to changes in the set of zero restrictions employed.
First, we re-estimate the model including Earn. in all five equations. The coefficient on Earn
is negative and marginally significant in the Chgo equation (t of -1.64 in the two stage least
squares estimation) and is not statistically significant (t of .59) in the Chfund equation.
Relaxing this restriction has virtually no effect on the other parameter values. Second,
because its coefficient is consistently opposite to what would be predicted from our model,
The results are qualitatively similar to
our original specification.
We change the assumed determinants of the non-discretionary components of Prov by
relaxing the restriction that the coefficient on prior period’s non-performing loans be the
variables.
36 This modification increases the standard errors of the coefficient on Pcap in the
This formulation also results in slightly larger standard errors for the coefficient on the
Chfund regressor in the Prov equation. Other results remain essentially unchanged.
Finally, we test the overidentifying restrictions using the lagrange multiplier test described
in Kennedy [1992] pg 172. Consistent with our formulation of the model, we fail to reject
the extra zero restrictions at conventional levels in all five equations.
35We find that estimated parameters of the full model by peer groups are sensitive to the definition of
Miscg. Again, there are relatively few observations per parameter limiting our ability to draw conclusions
from these subsamples.
276 Summary and Accounting Implications
6.1 Summary
Generally we find that loan charge-offs, loan loss provisions, and the decision to issue secu-
rities are jointly determined. Apparently, this interaction results from the use of all three
transactions to manage primary capital ratios. We cannot reject the hypothesis that pension
settlement gains and gains from miscellaneous transactions are determined independently of
the other four decisions, although both appear to be used to manage end-of-period earnings.
The results concerning the use of Miscg to manage capital and taxes are less robust. Under
some specifications, we find evidence that gains from miscellaneous transactions are used to
manage capital, and that gains from sales of investment securities are used to manage taxes.
Although our conclusions are not dissimilar from prior and concurrent studies using
research designs that do not account for the joint decision making, e.g. Moyer [1990], Scholes
et al. [1990], Haw et al. [1991] and Collins et al. [1993], our analysis suggests that taking
account of simultaneity is important. The distinction is especially important in analyzing
loan loss provisions, loan charge-offs and financing decisions. To the extent we can generalize
to the samples used in prior studies,
37 our results suggest that accounting for simultaneity
could change conclusions of those studies.
Our evidence is fairly consistent with the framework used to generate our system of
equations; we find broad support for the hypotheses that deviating from capital and earnings
goals is costly, and that bank managers trade-off costly accrual and financing discretion to
meet these goals. However, the model is not completely adequate along all dimensions.
Hausman tests comparing OLS and 2SLS parameter estimates reject the hypothesis that
pension settlement gains and miscellaneous gains are jointly determined, and under most
specifications, the Hausman test comparing 2SLS with 3SLS rejects the null hypothesis of
37Scholes et al. [1990] and Moyer [1990] both draw samples from 1981-1986. Collins et al. [1993] analyze
data from 1971-1991.no misspecification. In addition, in at least one case, the estimated coefficients seem to
violate restrictions implied by our model (i.e. the partial correlations of Pen and Prov).
Sensitivity analysis indicates that misspecification possibly derives from decision param-
eters that vary across time (or across banks), possibly due to changes in underlying economic
events. For example, risk based capital standards likely changed the way in which banks
manage the provision for loan losses since the new definitions of capital do not include the
reserve for loan losses. We also find evidence that misspecification could be due to how Miscg
is constructed.
Misspecification could also derive from other untested assumptions of our model. Dis-
continuities in the cost function could be important. For example, we do not relax the
assumption that the costs associated with deviating from target are symmetric above and
below. In addition, we do not consider constraints on the discretion available to managers.
38
Models incorporating such discontinuities would require to non-linear estimation techniques.
Finally, we assume that all discretion occurs at year-end even though banks issue quarterly
statements to capital markets and regulators. Failing to take account of quarterly manage-
ment of accounting reports could lead us to conclude that sequential decisions are jointly
determined.
6.2 Accounting Implications
Taken together with other studies, several of the results are provocative. Our evidence
suggests that banks choose loan charge-offs and provisions to manage capital as opposed to
their setting these accruals to reflect estimates of loan quality. Moreover, there is evidence
that both the provision and charge-offs are traded off with miscellaneous gains and issues of
securities for capital management purposes. All this suggests that managers make a complex
determination about both accruals in light of other capital-raising activities. Although we
38For example the discretion available to mangers to realize gains from securities is limited by the difference
between market and book value for the portfolio of securities held. Once these gains have been exhausted,
managers face infinite costs of realizing more.
29have strong evidence that banks manage their loan loss accruals, we have not attempted to
assess the magnitude of this manipulation relative to auditing standards, which would be of
key interest to accounting policy makers and bank regulators.
Consistent with the contention of mark-to market advocates, that banks will selectively
sell-off securities for the accounting side-effects, we find that banks appear to execute the
investment decisions underlying Miscg to manage income. However, we also find that the
level of loan loss accruals and financing choices depend on the level of miscellaneous gains
that firms realize. This means that marking investment securities to market value can have
consequences that regulators may not have anticipated. In particular, removing the ability
to exercise discretion along this dimension is likely to increase discretion along another. Our
results suggest that without other constraints on managerial behavior, the mark-to-market
rule could change the way in which managers report loan loss provisions, loan charge-offs,
and how they time decisions to sell other assets with unrealized gains or losses.
Finally, we find evidence that the decision to issue equity, capital notes, and preferred
stock depends on miscellaneous gains and loan loss accruals. This evidence combined with
our other findings suggests that firm financing decisions can depend on the level of account-
ing discretion managers are able to exercise and vice versa. Although there are many studies
in the costly contracting and monitoring literature postulating that leverage levels affect ac-
counting choices, there are few which attempt to document if this relation works in reverse,
e.g. that decisions about accounting affect the timing of securities issuances. Our frame-
work proposes and our evidence supports the notion that accrual, investment, and financing
decisions are not independent. In the context of contracting and monitoring motivations
for accounting choices, this means that focusing solely on the accounting system’s role in
mitigating these costs potentially omits important correlated factors.
30Appendix A
This appendix describes how the variables used in the empirical work are determined. If the
variable is obtained from Bank Compustat, we list the data item number following its description.
Otherwise, the data are identified as hand-collected. All of the variables, except dummy variables,
are deflated by end-of-year reported assets for the purposes of estimating our system of equations.
A.1 Endogenous Variables
1. Loan Loss Provision (Prov)- This is an expense, giving   income recognition to loan losses.
The loan loss provision increases the reserve for loan losses. (Bank Compustat Item 135)
2. Charge-Offs (Chgo) - These are the amount of loans determined to be uncollectible during the
period less recoveries. Loan charge-offs reduce the reserve for loan losses. (Bank Compustat
Item 190)
3. Change in External Funds (Chfund) - Chfund is the amount of primary capital issued during
the year, i.e. the sum of common stock, preferred stock, and capital notes issued. Issuances
of preferred plus capital notes are based on hand-collected primary capital figures. We back
out the level of preferred plus capital notes using the primary capital ratio in the annual
report and data from Bank Compustat as follows:
The level of capital notes plus preferred in a period can then be calculated by multiplying
this difference by sum of assets and the loan loss reserve.
Issuances of common equity is estimated as the change in the sum of Compustat items 88
and 95 from period t-1 to t. This change will be higher, mechanically, if a bank engages in a
pooling transaction. We view poolings not as financing decisions, but as investment decisions.
Accordingly we code the change in equity associated with large pooling transactions to be
zero. To identify large poolings, we calculated the percentage change in common shares per
Bank Compustat. If this percentage change was greater than l0%, we searched the financial
statement in that year for pooling transactions.
4. Pension Settlement Gains (Pen)- Pen measures the pre-tax amount of pension settlement
gains reported. A pension settlement occurs when a firm with a defined benefit pension plan
pays another firm (typically an insurance company) to assume part of its pension liability.
Under SFAS 88, firms with overfunded plans can recognize gains on these transactions in
proportion to the fraction of the projected benefit obligation discharged in the year of the
transaction. When the obligation is discharged, assets and liabilities related to the trans-
actions are effectively defeased.
32 Under SFAS 87, the effects of the overfunding would
32In substance these transactions are much like pension plan terminations, except that the excess assets
do not revert to the firm, and the firm does not incur any current tax liability from the settlement. In
addition, the excise tax surcharges on pension plan reversions are also avoided. A reversion occurs when the
firm appropriates (i.e., takes control of) the excess assets remaining after the obligation is settled.
31eventually surface in the income statement, but the important feature for our purposes is
that the settlement accelerates the income effects of the overfunding into the current period.
These amounts were hand-collected, in general from the management discussion.
5. Miscellaneous Gain Items (Miscg) - The income effects of a variety of transactions are iden-
tified by reading the income statements of the sample firms, and by reading the Management
Discussion and Analysis sections of the annual reports. As suggested in the text, the income 
from these transactions are included based on the judgment that their timing is determined
in part by accountin, g considerations. We include items that have both positive and negative
effects on income. The Miscg items are as follows:
(a) Income from investment security transactions Sg - Income from sales of securities in
banks’ investment portfolios is recognized when securities are sold. In contrast to the
accounting for securities held by industrial companies (and accounted for under SFAS
12), in banks it is based on historical cost (adjusted for interest amortization in the case
of bonds). Thus, gains and losses from sales can be used to time income recognition
for each individual security. This is the only Miscg item that could be collected from
Compustat. (Bank Compustat Item 153)
(b) Income from sales of assets - The most common of these is the sale of facilities, e.g., the
sale of a headquarters building. Only the current-year income effects of sale-leasebacks
are recorded.
(c) Income from sales of investments/subsidiaries - In addition to items in their investment
portfolios, firms have other investments that they sell during the sample period. These
include income from sales of equity investments and venture capital investments. These
items are reported separately from income from securities gains and losses. In addition,
we include income from the sales of subsidiaries.
(d) Income from selected loan securitizations - Loan securitization transactions are not
unlike loan sales. These transactions differ from outright loan sales, in that banks
sell special securities that are backed by loans receivable (or future loans receivable)
of the bank. Investors purchase these securities, thereby obtaining rights to (part of
the) interest and (all of the) principal repayment on the loan. From an accounting
standpoint, the transaction is like a sale.
(e) Income from sales of servicing rights - Banks that originate mortgage loans often sell the
loans, but retain what are called servicing rights. The bank selling the loan processes
loan payments and passes payments through to the loan purchaser. The bank sells the
loan at a lower yield than the rate charged to the borrower, so that the spread between
these two rates represents a valuable asset. Banks sometimes sell these servicing rights,
triggering recognition of a gain or loss on the sale.
(f) Income from sales of credit card portfolios - Income effects of the sale of credit card
operations are recorded.
33
33A number of banks have recently sold or are trying to sell their credit card operations. For banks other
than the largest money center banks, such sales can have an enormous effect on the financial statements.
For example, Michigan National Corporation’s sale of its credit card portfolio to Chase Manhattan in 1989
resulted in a pre-tax gain of $225 million. The 1989 income for Michigan National was $187 million, meaning
32(g) Accruals related to restructuring/termination programs - If firms give income statement
recognition to items related to staff reduction or restructuring, the income effects are
recorded. In general, these items have a negative effect on income. Although we gen-
erally include items in Miscg that are accompanied by immediate cash flow effects, we
expect that cash flow effects of these accruals, if not immediate, are virtually immediate.
(h) Income effects of debt retirements - Income effects of early debt retirements are recorded,
on a before-tax basis.
A.2 Exogenous Variables
1. Primary Capital Before Endogenous Items (Pcap) - This is the primary capital before the
effects of discretionary items. In general primary capital equals the sum of retained earnings,
the allowance for loan losses, preferred and common stock, and eligible debt securities, all
scaled by the sum of assets and the allowance for loan losses. We hand-collected end of the
year primary capital, from the financial statements of the sample firms. We then back-out
the effects of the endogenous variables. (We assume a tax rate of 34%.)
2. Earnings Before Endogenous Items(Earn) - We start with operating earnings (Bank Compu-
stat Item 145) net of Miscg and pension settlement gains that also are included in operating
items. To this we add back the current loan loss provision (Bank Compustat Item 135). As
defined by Bank Compustat, operating earnings includes the effects of the loan loss provision,
but excludes the effects of securities gains and losses. Thus, to obtain Earn from item 145,
we add back the loan loss provision and certain Miscg components, but do not add back
securities gains and losses.
the firm. If the firm has a net operating loss carryforward at the end of 1985 or 1986, the
a value of 1 if the firm has a net operating loss in the current year, where the year is 1987,
1988, or 1989. If the firm has no net operating loss in the current year, this variable assumes
a value of 0. The net operating loss carryforwards were hand-collected from the tax footnote
in the financial statements.
4. Money Center Indicator (MC) - This is a dummy variable, assuming a value of 1 if the bank
is Citicorp, Chase Manhattan, First Chicago, First Interstate, BankAmerica, Wells Fargo,
Manufacturers Hanover, J.P. Morgan, Bankers Trust, Security Pacific, or Chemical Bank.
(Continental Illinois is not in our sample due to regulatory supervision.)
5. Loans to Developing Country Indicator (Ldc)- This is a dummy variable taking on a value of
1 from 1987-1989 if the bank has non-performing loans to lesser developed countries. These
banks were identified using Statistics 1992 U S Bank Holding Companies published by IBCA
Inc in 1993.
that a substantial portion of the firm’s income for the year was generated by the sale. Note also that this
gain amounts to approximately 20 percent of the firm’s 1989 owner’s equity, so this one transaction had a








Apens - This item models the supply of pension settlement gains available. It is calculated
as the current year-end pension assets plus pension settlement gains during the year minus
the current year-end benefit obligation. Since none of the sample firms settled pensions for
losses, if this difference is negative, Apens is set to zero. These data are hand-collected from
the pension footnote.
loans includes so-called non-accruing loans (loans on which the firm does not accrue any
interest revenue, even if interest is being paid) and restructured loans (loans on which the
bank is collecting interest at a lower rate than originally stipulated in the loan contract).
Non-performing  loans are hand-collected from the financial statements of the sample firms.
to-year change in Npl (item 7 above).
Compustat. (Bank Compustat 78)
Yldbv- the book value of investment securities multiplied by the
securities for the year, calculated using Moyer’s [1990] formula.
all investments mature in one year:
This item is collected from
change in the yield on debt
The formula assumes that
where
Average yield on a portfolio of 20 long term bonds in prior year. (This series
is collected from Bond Buyer Yearbook 1990 by the American Banker.)
Average yield on a portfolio of 20 long term bonds in current year.
Beginning of the year book value of investment securities from Bank Com-
pustat item 8
is hand-collected from the primary capital disclosures as discussed in section A.l, 3) above.
stat (Bank Compustat items 88 and 95)
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